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Studying Spatial Conceptualization 
across Cultures: Anthropology and 
Cognitive Science 
STEPHEN C. LEVINSON 
ABSTRACT Philosophers, psychologists, and linguists have ar- 
gued that spatial conception is pivotal to cognition in general, 
providing a general, egocentric, and universal framework for 
cognition as well as metaphorsfor conceptualizing many other 
domains. But in an aboriginal community in Northern Queens- 
land, a system of cardinal directions informs not only language, 
but also memory for arbitrary spatial arrays and directions. 
This work suggests that fundamental cognitive parameters, like 
the system of coding spatial locations, can vary cross-culturally, 
in line with the language spoken by a community. This opens up 
the prospect of afruitful dialogue between anthropology and the 
cognitive sciences on the complex interaction between cultural 
and universalfactors in the constitution of mind. 
ANTHROPOLOGY AND COGNmVE SCIENCE 
There is little doubt that in the history of ideas the rise of the cognitive 
science movement will be seen as one of the main intellectual develop- 
ments of the second half of this century. Its inception was blessed with bril- 
liant spokesmen like Lashley, Chomsky, and Miller, and perhaps most 
importantly with a Goliath of a target-the huge but vulnerable scientism 
of behaviorism. The core notions were that mental processes could be 
thought of as operations over rich internal representations-too rich to be 
learned in their entirety-and that these representations and the opera- 
tions on them could be studied in a rigorous way, and modelled using the 
new mathematical methods arising from the theory of computing. These 
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ideas spread to encroach on a dozen disciplines, forming a loose coalition 
of fields as diverse as philosophy, neurophysiology, electronics, linguis- 
tics, psychology, evolutionary biology, vision theory, and the like. An in- 
itial member of that coalition, indeed part of the original inspiration in the 
1960s, was cognitive anthropology, at that time rich in ideas, methods, and 
ambitions. Since then, with some notable exceptions like the ethnobiologi- 
cal work or the cognition-in-practice movement, anthropology has largely 
elected to withdraw from active participation or dialogue, partly from a dis- 
taste with the psychologism, reductionism, and scientific pretensions of 
the cognitive science movement. In some respects, it is true, the move- 
ment itself has slipped increasingly away from an emphasis on the role of 
meaning in mental life toward more mechanistic and reductionist ac- 
counts of information processing (as one of its founding fathers, Jerome 
Bruner [1990], has complained). 
This article will suggest that, nevertheless, thoughtless rejection is not 
an adequate response to such an important intellectual movement. The 
goals of cognitive science-to illumine our mental life, to understand its in- 
ner workings, to plumb the sources of our ideas and the frameworks of our 
knowledge-are hardly alien to anthropology. Its presuppositions-that 
representations can be studied structurally, and that in certain respects 
the mental life of our species must be continuous with neighboring species, 
while at the same time it is transformed by language and external cultural 
representations-are, again, not obnoxious to the anthropological palate. 
What offends (for example, the objectivist and reductionist rhetoric) is in 
many respects window dressing. More fundamentally, however, the move- 
ment has opened up whole worlds of human experience-the worlds of the 
blind, the deaf, the mentally impaired, preverbal infants-that were as lost 
to us as the cultures of the pre-ethnographic age. It has shown us the intri- 
cacies of inner communications- how our eyes talk to our hands, our ver- 
bal memories to our imagery. It has shown us how truly miraculous the 
construction of a coherent conscious experience is from the flotsam and 
jetsam of fragmentary sensation. Above all, what has been unfolded for us 
is a glimpse of the true complexity of the workings of the mind. 
In the context of this revolution in our understanding of the mind, the 
anthropological attitude looks truly confused: here is a discipline that cen- 
trally studies ideas and values and yet by and large subscribes to a zero the- 
ory of mind, if it bothers to think about it at all (Cosmides and Tooby 1994). 
But just as anthropology urgently needs a theory of mind, so the cognitive 
science movement needs the fresh vision that comes from seeing that hu- 
man affairs can be arranged in such different ways. If the enterprise is to 
succeed, it will require cross-cultural evidence of a sort that only anthro- 
pology can provide. If it is to fail, it will fail quite largely on its inability to 
handle cultural variation and the impact of the cultural environment on 
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the workings of mind. And if some parallel movement more responsive to 
cultural variation and to the peculiar ontological status of cultural ideas is 
to arise, it will do so only on the prompting of anthropologists. Epistemo- 
logical questions are central to the cognitive sciences, yet the core disci- 
plines, with the exception of linguistics, have no ready access to one basic 
touchstone deciding between innate and acquired abilities, namely cul- 
tural variation. In short, indifference or haughty disdain is hardly a respon- 
sible reaction from a discipline like our own that has so clearly lost a 
coherent voice in the very period that has seen the successful growth of the 
cognitive science movement. At the very least, it is incumbent on us to 
bring the facts of cultural variation to bear on cognitive science theories 
that are, as it were, formulated in the dark. 
If cognitive science could use a good dose of anthropological fact and 
perspective, so anthropological theory could use a theory of mind. In par- 
ticular, anthropological positions on epistemology are often downright 
primitive, unreflectingly echoing the tabula rasa assumptions of the behav- 
iorism of half a century ago-appearing to many commentators as an acute 
liability and hindrance to any serious progress toward a science of social 
life (see e.g., Sperber 1987; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). How can we possi- 
bly have theories of socialization and culture transmission without an ade- 
quate theory of mind? Would not such theories amount in effect to a theory 
of possible cultures, predicting what can and cannot be easily learned by 
humans through socialization, and thus delimiting the very bounds of hu- 
man culture? A sophisticated theory of the interrelation between culture 
and mind seems a precondition to any serious theory of society. 
It is time for a serious dialogue between the sciences of cognition and 
the sciences of culture and society. If anthropologists can show in a rigor- 
ous way that certain fundamental aspects of cognition are shaped by cul- 
tural factors, the dialogue will commence forthwith. We might study child 
development (see e.g., Stigler et al. 1991), we might explore the nature of 
memory in illiterate societies, or we might look at particular domains of 
human experience and compare the corresponding mental representa- 
tions in different cultures. Following this last strategy, we can employ, in 
addition to the careful observation of everyday practice, the many meth- 
ods that have been developed within the cognitive sciences to explore the 
nature of conceptual categories. 
One interesting test ground is spatial cognition-how space is con- 
ceived of and talked about in different languages and cultures. It is a good 
domain for such investigations because it seems to be central to human 
cognition, providing the essential framework for concrete thinking about 
objects and events as well as for abstract thinking about many other do- 
mains (witness the proliferation of spatial metaphors in mathematics, kin- 
ship, social class, etc.). One can begin the study of spatial thinking without 
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necessary commitment to the presumption of the universal nature of the 
Kantian categories such as time, space, and cause; the fieldworker can ex- 
pect to find the initial categories of any investigation reflected back in a dis- 
torting mirror. Aspects of spatial thinking are already extensively explored 
in anthropological writings on cosmology, symbolism, design, and land 
use. Spatial distinctions are also much studied throughout the sciences of 
cognition, from neurophysiology through linguistics to cognitive and de- 
velopmental psychology. Consequently there are a wealth of hypotheses 
about the essential nature of human spatial cognition that can be tested 
against field data.1 The overall burden of these hypotheses, to which we 
now turn, is that spatial cognition at first sight seems the very least likely 
domain in which to find cultural variation. 
THEORIES OF SPATIAL COGNmON IN THE COGNITIVE SCI NCES 
In cognitive science there is much talk about mental representations 
and an inner language of thought. The nature of these representations is as- 
sumed to be largely innate, part of our biological endowment, the assump- 
tion buttressed by arguments to the effect that organisms simply could not 
learn all the relevant structures given their computational and temporal 
limitations. These categories and their combinatorial properties can then 
be expected to project into language and other aspects of behavior, and this 
projection should be discernible in the process of child development. Cul- 
tural factors can be supposed to have only minimal influence on all of these 
processes. (This strong universalizing bias will be familiar to anthropolo- 
gists through contact with theoretical linguists, especially of the 
Chomskyan persuasion; but linguists at least are faced with reconciling 
deeply variant language systems with such universal tenets, whereas stu- 
dents of vision or memory or inference have no such daily reminders of cul- 
tural difference.) 
Take space as an example. Each of us has an elaborate mammalian in- 
heritance of spatial perception and processors. The vestibular system 
measures angles in relation to the vertical, and velocities in every direc- 
tion. The visual system isolates objects from their background, recon- 
structs their three-dimensional shape,gives us estimates of depth and size, 
and so on, utilizing specialized neural networks, with processing underway 
long before the signals even reach the brain. Binaural hearing helps us lo- 
cate noises, and touch gives us, like vision, access to shapes and textures, 
but also direct access to three-dimensional properties of things. Our motor 
system in turn has to be geared to all this information so that we can steer 
our way around. Specialized neurological hardware shared with other pri- 
mates can be shown to be responsible for many aspects of these different 
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kinds of spatial perception, so there is little room for doubt that all this 
forms part of our common culture-independent biological endowment. 
In view of the kinds of cultural difference that will be described below, 
it is important to appreciate the biological underpinnings to our sense of 
space. Here are a few details and further references. First, there is evidence 
that spatial information is not only functionally separate but neurally dis- 
tinct in mammals from other kinds of information. (For example, "the rat 
uses for navigation representations of space that involve different compu- 
tations and largely different neural substrates than those used for remem- 
bering simple associations between specific objects and reward, or between 
specific motor acts and reward" [Leonard and McNaughton 1990:380; 
Schone 1984]). Some parts of the brain, like the hippocampus, seem to be 
primarily dedicated to spatial memory, as detailed in O'Keefe and Nadel 
(1978) and Paillard (1991b) (see also Rolls 1990 on the memory for 
scenes). Other parts of the brain seem dedicated to correlating spatial in- 
formation. Thus evidence from direct recording techniques as well as le- 
sions show that the posterior parietal cortex is an area of the brain where 
the different sensory signals-visual, tactile, auditory, vestibular, proprio- 
ceptive, and so on-"create a network for transforming sensory input into 
signals suitable for motor control" (Stein 1992:193). On the other hand, 
less egocentric cognitive maps of the environment seem to be maintained 
in the hippocampus, where particular cells seem to record specific places 
(O'Keefe 1991:273; Stein 1992:211). Some important functional distinc- 
tions seem to correlate with different neural pathways: for example, know- 
ing what something is seems to involve distinct pathways from knowing 
where something is (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982). This correlates with 
foveal and peripheral vision, static versus dynamic visual perception, also 
perhaps distance versus direction coding (Paillard 1991a). 
Now this varied source of inputs, together with a varied source of out- 
puts (includinggesture, language, and movement), seems to argue for a sin- 
gle level or inner language of spatial conception, into which the different 
kinds of information (visual, tactile, auditory, etc.) can be translated. One 
of the main tasks of such computation, the neurological work suggests, is to 
reconcile the different egocentric reference frames related to vision, hear- 
ing, hand movement, and so on, requiring some normalized ego center. It is 
naturally supposed that this "language" or representation system is also 
universal, presumably largely innate. The kind of essential notions in- 
volved would seem at the very least to utilize a system of three planes 
through the human body: one dividing front and back, one dividing upper 
from lower, and one dividing left from right. These planes are in fact instan- 
tiated in the inner ear by the three semicircular canals, which measure 
changes of location in each plane. 
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The neurobiological work on space is one current of thinking in the 
cognitive sciences. Another is based on the long tradition of speculation, 
observation, and experimentation about the conceptual foundations of 
spatial reasoning. Immanuel Kant, for example, argued in an early paper 
(1991[ 1768]) that naive spatial reasoning is inevitably based on an egocen- 
tric and anthropomorphic basis: we find in the divisions of the body into 
front and back, and left and right, the fundamental axes of our framework 
for space. Since then much speculation and empirical work on language, 
child development, and cognitive psychology has suggested the essential 
veracity of Kant's presumption. As Miller and Johnson-Laird have put it, 
The conceptual core of space probably originates, as Cassirer (1923) and others have 
maintained, with the body concept-with what is at, in, or on our own bodies. The first 
spatial relatum we learn to use is ego .... Piaget and Inhelder (1948) claim that escape 
from this egocentric space requires considerable cognitive development. . . . The ability 
to decenter does not displace the egocentric conception of space, but it supplements 
it.... Egocentric use of the space concept places ego at the center of the universe. From 
this point of origin ego can lay out a three-dimensional co-ordinate system that depends 
on his own orientation. With respect to this landmark other objects can be located as 
above or below (ego), in front or in back (of ego), to the left or to the right (of ego). 
[1976:394-395] 
The presumption of the universal basis of this egocentric and anthropo- 
morphic conception of space can be found throughout the branches of the 
sciences of mind. For example, in the study of language acquisition, it is 
commonly held that 
The child acquires English expressions for space and time by learning how to apply these 
expressions to the a priori knowledge he has about space and time. This a priori knowl- 
edge is separate from language itself and not so mysterious .... The child is born into a 
flat world with gravity, and he himself is endowed with eyes, ears, an upright posture, and 
other biological structure. These structures alone lead him to develop a perceptual 
space, a P-space, with very specific properties. [Clark 1973:28] 
Thus, in curt overview, the picture of human spatial abilities coming to us 
from the sciences of cognition is one in which both the underlying neuro- 
physiology and the conceptual superstructure is egocentric and anthropo- 
morphic in the sense that our naive cognition about space makes primary 
use of the planes through the human body as the essential coordinates of 
spatial conception. 
CULTURAL V RIATION: ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE SYSTEMS OF 
SPATIAL CONCEPTION 
There are plenty of clues in the anthropological and linguistic litera- 
ture to suggest that this picture of uniform human spatial conception is 
incorrect (Levinson 1996b). But, for the most part, careful comparative in- 
vestigation is lacking. Consequently, in ongoing work by the Max Planck 
Institute for Psycholinguistics, a sample of over a dozen non-Western 
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societies are being intensively investigated using a battery of elicitation 
tools, experimental techniques, and open-ended participant-observation. 
The findings are interesting because it seems that in many cultures (as sug- 
gested by at least a third of the small sample) spatial conception is organ- 
ized in a fundamentally different way than expected on the basis of familiar 
Western languages, and indeed the observations in the Western scientific 
and philosophical traditions as outlined above. 
Whereas the vertical dimension, based on gravitation with all its ef- 
fects on our balance and stance, emerges as a universal organizing princi- 
ple for spatial conception, the treatment of angles on the horizontal is 
clearly underdetermined by any natural force. The cognitive science pre- 
diction, as reviewed, is that the solution to finding directions on the hori- 
zontal will be to import ego's body axes, so that we can find from ego's point 
of view an angle "in front" of him or her, an angle "behind," and an angle to 
the "left" and "right." This proves to be only one solution, our own cultur- 
ally familiar one. It has the consequence that horizontal directions change 
with ego's bodily position, and differ from ego to alter. Hence we may call 
this solution relative-angles on the horizontal are found relative to an in- 
dividual's point of view. 
An alternative solution is to fix the directions once and for all, like our 
North, South, East, and West. It matters not at all where the angles or direc- 
tions are fixed, just so long as everyone in the community adopts the same 
solution.2 Such absolute directions, as we shall call them, do not vary with 
bodily rotation, do not depend on point of view, and effectively remain 
identical for ego and alter. Compare for example a situation where Bill is 
standing five meters from a tree: in English I may describe him as behind, 
in front, or to the left or right of the tree, according to my position; but in a 
language that uses fixed angles, Bill will remain, say, West of the tree re- 
gardless of my position. (Obviously, what is West of me will vary with my 
position, although invariant to my rotation; thus such systems may be used 
egocentrically or from a particular viewpoint, but unlike relative systems 
they need not be.) 
It turns out that many languages lack spatial descriptions like the Eng- 
lish words and phrases in front, in back, left, and right, instead employing 
terms for fixed or cardinal directions. Such absolute systems are intriguing 
from an anthropological view for a number of reasons. First, an absolute, 
arbitrary fixed direction is necessarily a social artifact; unlike the vertical 
dimension, there is nothing directly in the human body or in the environ- 
ment that will provide precise fixed angles on the horizontal. True, such 
systems may arise from abstraction out of seasonal movements of the sun 
around the solstices, or from prevailing wind directions, drainage of major 
rivers or overall inclinations of terrain-but they are culturally fixed 
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abstractions. A child must learn whatever the local system is and treat it as 
an arbitrary invariant for purposes of spatial reckoning. 
Second, it is clear that relative systems contrast with absolute systems 
in their comparative strengths and weaknesses, and differential utility. 
Relative systems are good for the handling of arbitrary arrays of chattels 
from an egocentric point of view: good, for example, for instructing some- 
one how to lay the table with forks to the left, knives to the right. Absolute 
systems fail here completely: there is no translation of "forks to the left" 
into a general rule in terms of fixed angles like north or west. On the other 
hand, relative systems are viewpoint dependent: if the fork is to my left, 
and you are opposite me, then my fork is to your right. But my knife is, say, 
west of my fork for both you and me. Further, "west" is a transitive, asym- 
metric relation good for reasoning about locations (if the cup is west of the 
knife, which is west of the fork, then the cup is also west of the fork), while 
"left" is unreliably so. In short, if you are interested in egocentric perspec- 
tives on local arrays, a relative system makes sense; but if you are inter- 
ested in locations in a landscape, or local arrays without an egocentric or 
privileged viewpoint, then an absolute system has all the advantages. A 
relative system fits with a culture that promotes individual perspective, 
that is preoccupied with viewpoint-dependent order-as enshrined for ex- 
ample in domestic architecture or writing systems, symbolisms of left and 
right, or ceremonial arrangements of chattels. An absolute system permits 
abstraction away from individual perspective, allowing individuals to be- 
come mere points in a landscape (permitting, but not requiring: absolute 
systems allow insistent use of ego as a reference point- see the companion 
article by Haviland). No doubt these associations are too simplistic to fully 
capture the ranges of use of either kind of system, but up to a point they 
seem to match the characteristics of the societies that utilize them. 
LANGUAGE ND COGNmON IN AN ABSOLUTE SYSTEM 
Systems of absolute direction are most easily detected through lin- 
guistic distinctions encoding fixed directions. These may not at first be 
transparent: in many cases there is an abstraction from a landscape feature 
(uphill vs. downhill, or upstream vs. downstream) or meteorological ten- 
dency (windward vs. leeward, sunset vs. sunrise), with the descriptive 
terms retained but with fixed directions intended (not locally uphill, or not 
windward in this particular wind, not the location of sunset at this particu- 
lar season, etc.). The telltale sign is where, for local arrays of objects on the 
horizontal plane, descriptions are couched in such larger landscape fea- 
tures ("the cup on the up end of the table" or "the basket to windward"). One 
may then expect to find instructions like "take the second turning uphill" 
(rather than "left") or "move over leeward" (rather than "right"), and so on. 
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A linguistic system of fixed directions has cognitive implications: 
speakers must be able to detect the exact angles intended and agree about 
where "windward," "upstream," or "north," and so on, lies. Indeed the cog- 
nitive implications turn out to be far-reaching. We can best explore this 
with an example. 
The Guugu-Yimithirr speaking people of Hopevale, North Queens- 
land, use an absolute system of spatial description to the exclusion of rela- 
tive notions like "front," "back," "left," and "right." The linguistic system 
and its uses are nicely described in the article by Haviland in this issue, 
which may be read as a companion piece.3 He emphasizes the egocentric 
use of the system, but it is perfectly normal to use the system in a nonego- 
centric way, anchored to nonhuman reference points ("north of the river") 
or to humans other than the speaker ("north of the protagonist"). 
To explore the cognitive implications of this system a number of infor- 
mal experiments were undertaken. First, we wished to know something 
about the sense of direction that would be required to allow a linguistic sys- 
tem of this kind to work. One should note too that Guugu Yimithirr speak- 
ers expect the linguistic specification of angle to be supplemented by more 
accurate gestural indications (see again Haviland, this issue). More will be 
required than merely knowing where "north," "south," and so on lie.4 For 
in order to specify somebody's motion from, say, the current place of 
speaking toward the local town, a speaker will need to know what angle the 
local town lies at from the place of speaking. Thus, one's own location 
north, south, east, and west of all likely reference points had better be de- 
terminable: in short, Guugu Yimithirr speakers need to constantly dead- 
reckon their current position, taking into account distance travelled and 
constant changes in angular bearings. This we tested by taking ten men out 
on bush trips to various locations on different occasions, and by asking 
them to point at a range of other locations differing in distance from 7 to 
300 km. In over 120 observations, whether pointing to places frequently or 
infrequently visited, these men proved highly reliable: the average error 
was less than 14 degrees or 4 percent.5 Similar experiments on Western 
populations have yielded in contrast often near random pointings; British 
subjects for example, led 2-4km into a wood, are quite unlikely to be able to 
find their way back by a novel route (Baker 1989:101). In contrast, given 
the very rough terrain, and thus circuitous nature of travel, together with 
the lack of visibility from most of the questioning points, the dead-reckon- 
ing accuracy of our Guugu Yimithirr consultants is indeed impressive. (It 
compares favorably to those species, like pigeons, known to employ spe- 
cialized "hardware"-polarized light and magnetoreception-rather than 
"software"-concepts like cardinal directions-to solve this same problem). 
If the linguistic system is to work, this ability to dead-reckon is as it 
should be. Dead-reckoning clearly requires a constant monitoring of angular 
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rotation and distance travelled on each leg of a journey. But all this tells us 
only about thinkingfor speaking (Slobin 1996);6 it tells us how one must 
think if one is to speak Guugu Yimithirr. It does not alone show that think- 
ing in general about space is different in kind from, say, the way an English 
speaker thinks about it. We need some way to probe for how people con- 
ceive of spatial arrangements, about how they remember them or make cal- 
culations from them, when they are not speaking, but simply acting in space. 
To explore these issues a number of experiments were conducted. It 
was observed that Guugu Yimithirr speakers talked about previous experi- 
ences in terms of cardinal directions, thus implying that locations and mo- 
tions are coded for memory in absolute terms. For example, up to two 
months after the event, men who had participated in a land-rights meeting 
in a distant town could remember the disposition of their unfamiliar hotel 
rooms (with TV to the north of the bed, etc.), matching my records of the 
time. Various memory tasks were therefore devised to explore this, and we 
may informally report here on two, conducted on small samples (12-15) of 
older men (for the full details see Levinson 1997). 
How can one know how people unconsciously think about space, what 
nonverbal concepts are employed to distinguish positions and directions, 
and what their properties are? Naturally, this is problematic in detail, but 
in contrast it is not difficult to distinguish memories coded in terms of bod- 
ily position like left and right, from those coded in terms of fixed directions 
like north and south. To achieve this, the simple expedient was adopted of 
displaying an array with the subject facing north, and then turning the sub- 
ject 180 degrees around, and testing for memory and inference on arrays 
displayed while the subject was facing south. Two rooms connected by a 
door were arranged internally so that they presented the same visual ap- 
pearance when looked at through the door-thus any tendency to use 
viewer-centered spatial coordinates should be reinforced by this environment. 
In a first memory experiment, a subject facing north was asked to 
choose between two mirror-image cards-on one there was a large red 
square to the left (or west) of a blue rectangle, while on the other the red 
square was to the right (or east). The subject was then led across into the 
other room, so that he or she faced an identical array looking south, and 
asked (after about a minute) to identify the card he had previously chosen. 
Suppose in the first room the subject chooses the card with the large red 
square to the left (west). Would she or he, now facing the opposite direc- 
tion, choose the card with the red square to the left (and thus the east, indi- 
cating a left/right or relative coding scheme for memory), or would she or 
he choose the card with the red square to the west (and thus to the right, in- 
dicating a west/east or absolute coding scheme)? Figure 1 should make 
clear how, given a choice of card A before rotation of the subject, its identi- 
fication with card D after rotation, indicates the use of an egocentric or 
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Question: if a subject chooses A 
in Room 1, will she choose C or D 





Stimulus cards in Room 2 
Figure 1. Recognition Experiment: "Memorizing Chips" 
relative coordinate system, while its identification with card C indicates 
the use of an absolute coordinate system that does not rotate with the 
viewer. 
Each person performed a number of trials, with the relative positions 
of cards to each other varied, and the same experiment was conducted on a 
Dutch group for comparison. The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1 
Memorizing Chips: Individual Decisions. 
Orientation 
Group Absolute Relative Total 
Hopevale 27 7 34 
Dutch 1 44 45 
Hopevale versus chance: p = 0.0004 (binomial test, p = 0.5 for absolute, rela- 
tive); Dutch versus chance: p = 0.0000 (binomial test, same assumptions); Hope- 
vale versus Dutch; p = 0.0000 (Fischer's exact test). 
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Table 2 
Memorizing Chips: Subjects by Majority of Choices. 
Orientation 
Group Absolute Relative Total 
Hopevale 9 1 10 
Dutch 0 15 15 
Hopevale versus chance: p = 0.0107 (binomial test, p = 0.5 for absolute, rela- 
tive); Dutch versus chance: p = 0.0000 (binomial test, same assumptions); Hope- 
vale versus Dutch; p = 0.0000 (Fischer's exact test). 
What they show is that while the Dutch control group almost invariably 
coded in relative terms, a sample of (mature, male) Hopevale Guugu 
Yimithirr speakers tended to code in absolute terms. 
A slightly more complex task, involving both recognition and infer- 
ence, is illustrated in Figure 2. Here subjects were shown a "maze," de- 
scribed to them as a diagram of an incomplete route. After a demonstration, 
they were asked to remember the route displayed to them facing north. 
Then they were led to the other room, and now facing south, asked to 
choose between three cards which would complete the route. Now in fact 
two of the cards were identical except that they were rotated 180 degrees, 
while a third was a distractor. Anyone who mentally rotates the route map 
with himself will find natural the solution labelled "relative" in the dia- 
gram; anyone who holds the orientation of the route map constant in terms 
of cardinal orientation will adopt the solution labelled "absolute." 
As before, the same experiment was run both on a sample of Guugu 
Yimithirr-speaking men and on a Dutch control group, with the results as 
displayed in Tables 3 and 4. Once again, the Dutch almost always chose the 
relative solution, while two thirds of Hopevale subjects chose the absolute 
solution.7 
Table 3 
Maze Completion: Individual Decisions. 
Solution 
Group Absolute Relative Blind Total 
Hopevale 24 11 1 36 
Dutch 3 42 0 45 
Htopevale versus chance: p = 0.0000 (Multinomial test, assuming p = 0.3333 for 
absolute, relative, blind); Dutch versus chance: p = 0.0000 (multinomial test, 
same assumptions); Hopevale versus Dutch: p = 0.0000 (chi-square). 
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Figure 2. Recognition and Inference: The Maze Task 
These results seem to show quite clearly that Guugu Yimithirr speak- 
ers tend to memorize and think about spatial arrays in terms of fixed or ab- 
solute directions, even when performing essentially nonlinguistic tasks.8 
Together with much qualitative and anecdotal material (see e.g., 
Iaviland 1993, this issue; Levinson 1997), the results point to a way of 
thinking about space that is fundamentally different from our own. 
The Guugu Yimithirr way of thinking about space is fundamentally at 
odds with the predictions from many different branches of the cognitive 
sciences: the expectation has been that universally all naive human spatial 
conception is based on coordinates based on the human body, which thus 
rotate with us. Instead, it appears that whatever the biological foundations 
favoring this solution about how to think about angles on the horizontal, al- 
ternative cultural solutions are to be found, and that these can come to 
structure both verbal and nonverbal conceptualizations of spatial problems. 
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Table 4 
Maze Completion: Subjects by Majority of Choices. 
Orientation 
Group Absolute Relative Total 
Hopevale 8 4 12 
Dutch 0 15 15 
Hopevale versus chance: p = 0.1938 (binomial test, p = 0.5 for absolute, rela- 
tive); Dutch versus chance: p = 0.0000 (binomial test, same assumptions); IIope- 
vale versus Dutch; p = 0.0002 (Fischer's exact test). 
Since this investigation conducted in 1992, we have been able to show 
similar biases in memory and inference in other cultures; for example, us- 
ing more sophisticated techniques and larger samples we have shown that 
speakers of a Mayan language that favors use of cardinal-direction-like ab- 
solute coordinates reliably employ absolute coordinates in a wide range of 
tasks (Brown and Levinson 1993; Levinson 1996a; see also Levinson and 
Brown 1994 for exploration of the anthropological dimensions of the phe- 
nomenon). 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
There is more than one way of thinking and talking about space. One 
major cleavage is the opposition between absolute and relative ways of spa- 
tial reckoning.9 These differ in many fundamental ways: relative systems 
are viewpoint-dependent, and thus unreliable for inference; absolute sys- 
tems are viewpoint-independent, and good for inference; relative systems 
lend themselves to certain activities-for example, laying the table, or 
reading no as distinct from on, or describing the route down a system of 
corridors; absolute systems lend themselves to other activities-for exam- 
ple, finding one's way about in the wilderness, or describing routes where 
there are no roads or paths, or describing arrays that have no privileged an- 
gle of viewing. 
The importance of culture is self-evident here. A system of fixed orien- 
tations is a social fact in the Durkheimian sense: it is a system that is arbi- 
trary, might be otherwise, but whose existence constrains individuals. It 
can be learned only through communication. To use it requires constant 
background computations of a specialized sort that members of other com- 
munities may not indulge in at all. It would seem to be as good an example 
of "linguistic relativity" as one might hope for: a linguistic (and more 
broadly communicative) system may require one to think in a certain 
distinctive way. Of course, it is unlikely that there are indefinitely 
This content downloaded  on Wed, 6 Feb 2013 09:03:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Anthropology and Cognitive Science ? 21 
many,fundamentally different ways of thinking about space, but there are 
at least two and no doubt more. 
Such systems are not as predicted by specialists in the various 
branches of cognitive science. For the expectation was, no doubt in line 
with our own Western languages, that the egocentric and anthropomor- 
phic bias built into our neurology and anatomy (as in the inner ear) would 
directly reflect in linguistic and conceptual distinctions of a parallel sort. 
Iere we see a curious tendency in the cognitive sciences to fail to fully ex- 
ploit the computational metaphor: the mind is thought about as a computa- 
tional device with overemphasis on the hardware; linguists, for example, 
often presume that we may be able to obtain all the observable linguistic 
variation by means of "parameter setting," as if what was involved was set- 
ting a few dip switches, rather than thinking of distinct languages as run- 
ning quite different software on the same physical device. Demonstrating 
that the brain, the computing device, does not alone determine the archi- 
tecture of cognition, is an important task. We can exploit linguistic and cul- 
tural variation to show just that. Studies of spatial thinking across cultures 
have much to offer here. 
I have sketched the beginnings of a dialogue between ideas in the cog- 
nitive sciences and the study of everyday thought and practice in other cul- 
tures, focused on issues of spatial thinking. I have emphasized how 
experimental methods borrowed from psychology might be applied even in 
field conditions to answer questions about styles of thinking, which cannot 
be easily addressed simply by observing how people talk and act. That is 
not to deny that careful observation and case study will help to confirm the 
picture, a point made elegantly in the companion paper by Haviland in this 
issue. There will not be many of us who would prefer the lean facts re- 
ported here over the rich cultural detail he describes. The value of experi- 
mental methods are various: they centrally address a very limited 
hypothesis, and put it to the test with a reasonable range of individuals and 
tasks (in a way that anthropological interpretations are rarely hazarded), 
and they allow one to probe where commonsense observation may deliver 
no clear answer. But in this context they have an additional value: they are 
the coin of the other realm, and help to establish that what we know 
through detailed informal case study can be verified or cashed out in terms 
that any cognitive scientist must accept as evidence. A full-scale dialogue 
should be conducted on a fairer footing, where not only the nature of what 
counts as data is mutually respected, but where theoretical presupposi- 
tions on both sides are examined for the flaws that each can see in the 
other's unexamined line of argument. In that direction, the cognitive sci- 
ences have much to learn from us. But the doors need to be opened. 
In the long run we need much more sophisticated models of the com- 
plex interaction between the biological and cultural contributions to mind 
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than are currently to be found in either the anthropological or the cognitive 
sciences. There are currently many interesting developments throughout the 
behavioral sciences that argue for a coevolution of social and mental abili- 
ties (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Durham 1991; Goody 1995; Tooby and Cos- 
mides 1992). What we now need are detailed models that simultaneously 
explain in what ways the mind is preadapted to expect cultural input, and 
in what ways cultures are constrained to meet those expectations by limi- 
tations on human learning. This is a crucial intersection point for the sci- 
ences of the mind, the branches of anthropology, and the theory of 
evolution. One would hope that psychological anthropology would make 
central contributions to progress here. 
NOTS 
1. For a review of the background and the possibilities for field exploration see Levinson 1993. 
2. In this respect fixing cardinal directions is an arbitrary coordination problem, as 
explored in Schelling 1960 and Lewis 1969. Of course the rising and setting of heavenly 
bodies, locations on the far horizon, the lie of mountains, the fall of rivers and the like will 
provide useful reference points, and are utilized in many systems. For a review see Levinson 
1996a, 1996b, 1997. 
3. The basic linguistic and ethnographic work at Hopevale has been undertaken especially 
by Haviland (1979). I am enormously grateful to him and Lourdes de Le6n for much 
collaboration and discussion over the years, most recently in the field in July 1992. For further 
background see Haviland 1993, Levinson 1997 and references therein. 
4. Guugu Yimithirr speakers find the location of north and south quadrants, and so on, a 
trivial, commonsensical matter, whether out in the open on the reserve or inside an unfamiliar 
building without windows in a distant town. Since the root for, for example, "north" denotes 
a 90-degree arc, accuracy by pointing is in any case hard to assess (there is no conventional 
linguistic expression denoting the bisection of the arc). 
5. The details of this and the subsequent experiments, together with much associated 
information and caveat, may be found in Levinson 1997. 
6. Actually it tells us a little more: Slobin's thinking for speaking denotes a special kind 
of on-line thinking required just during the process of speech encoding-getting our thoughts 
into the shape required by a particular language for expression. But dead-reckoning will be 
a constant background cognitive task required even when not thinking for speaking, in order 
to have available the information to encode when the time for speaking occurs. 
7. Readers will note that in Table 4, the Guugu Yimithirr consultants' tendency toward 
absolute codings of spatial arrays is here not statistically significant (no doubt due to the 
sample size)-that is, they might have been randomly switching between absolute and relative 
strategies (what they are not doing is randomly selecting between possible responses, as 
shown by the tests in Table 3). But if so, that behavior is already significantly different from 
the behavior of Dutch subjects, who do not appear to have the absolute strategy available. 
8. To minimize the chance that thinkingfor speaking in Guugu Yimithirr was in play, the 
instructions were given in English. All Hopevale residents speak English, although the subjects 
for these experiments were all fluent speakers of Guugu Yimithirr who would seem normally 
to speak Guugu Yimithirr, or mixed Guugu Yimithirr and English, by preference. The current 
sociolinguistic situation is complex and fluid, with many residents preferring English for many 
purposes. Obviously bilingualism raises many pertinent further questions, which cannot, 
unfortunately, be adequately dealt with here. 
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9. The different spatial distinctions made in language are in fact interestingly complex. 
For an attempt to unravel some of the distinctions and build the foundations of a typology, 
see Levinson 1996. 
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